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The question raised by this volume is “How successful is naturalism?”
The question presupposes that we already know what naturalism is and what 
counts as success. But, as anyone familiar with the literature on naturalism 
knows, both suppositions are suspect. To answer the question, then, we must 
first say what we mean in this context by both ‘naturalism’ and ‘success’. I’ll 
start with ‘success’. I will then argue that, by the standard of measurement 
that I shall identify here, naturalism is an utter failure.
1. STANDARDS FOR SUCCESS
So what would it be for naturalism to be successful? Well, it could be any 
of a number of things. Naturalism would surely enjoy a kind of success if 
everyone were to become a naturalist, if becoming a naturalist were regularly 
and reliably attended by the immediate acquisition of wealth and happiness, 
if all and only non-naturalists were to spontaneously burst into flames, and so 
on. But whatever value might attach to these kinds of success, I doubt that 
they are what most of us are interested in when we inquire after the success 
of naturalism. Our aims are more modest. When we ask about the success of 
naturalism, I suspect that what we primarily want to know is whether it is 
subject to serious objections. If it is not, then it is at least modestly 
successful. If it is not and its rivals are, all the better.
Two related objections are commonly taken to devastate naturalism: first, 
that it is self-refuting; second, that it has rationally unacceptable 
consequences. For reasons that shall become clearer below, I think that both 
of these objections are non-starters—far from devastating, they aren’t even in 
the right ballpark. So I’ll leave them aside. What I want to focus on is a third 
sort of problem: the malady that a philosophical position suffers from when it 
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whatever attitudes, goals, or values partly characterize the position. For lack 
of a better label, call this malady dissonance. 
Not every philosophical position is characterized in part or whole by 
values, attitudes, or goals. Lewisian modal realism is a philosophical 
position, but there is no reason at all to think that anything like goals, values, 
or attitudes are even partly constitutive of that position. One reason for this is 
that there is no tradition associated with the position. The set of Lewisian 
modal realists almost certainly has fewer than ten members; and what unites 
them is arguably nothing more than adherence to the central thesis of On the 
Plurality of Worlds. Positions like empiricism, materialism, rationalism, and 
the like are different, however. Even if there are specific philosophical theses 
that express these positions, part of what it is to be an empiricist or a 
materialist or a rationalist is to manifest certain attitudes, goals, or values. As 
Bas van Fraassen (2002, 58ff) notes, adherents of these positions “know how 
to retrench” when developments in science or philosophy come into tension 
with theses they endorse, and it is the attitudes, goals, and values that serve as 
guides to the retrenchment.
It is not irrational to embrace a dissonant position, but it is unpleasant. 
Moreover, the role played by unpleasantness in our decisions about which 
philosophical positions to adopt is not to be underestimated. Dissonant 
theories fail along the dimensions of elegance and conservatism: by 
definition, they demand revision of pre-philosophical attitudes and values, 
and they break with traditions that we take seriously as guides to the positions 
we adopt. It is widely acknowledged that elegance and conservatism, among 
other pragmatic virtues, play an important role in scientific theory choice, and 
there is no reason to doubt that they play similar roles in philosophical 
decision making. Indeed, there is every reason to think that their role is all the 
more vital in decisions about philosophical positions that cannot be 
formulated as theses—positions like empiricism and materialism as they are 
understood by van Fraassen (of which more below), and like naturalism as I 
shall characterize it. 
Thus, to accuse a position of being dissonant is to level a serious charge 
against it. The charge isn’t as serious as self-defeat, or incoherence.
3Nevertheless, a position that is dissonant fails along an important dimension 
for measuring success. It is in this way, so I shall argue, that naturalism is a 
failure.
My argument has the form of a dilemma: If naturalism is a thesis, it is 
dissonant. If it is not a thesis, it avoids one kind of dissonance but falls prey 
to another. Either way, then, it is dissonant.
2. THE NATURE OF NATURALISM
In my book World Without Design, I argued that naturalism is not a 
philosophical thesis, but a research program. A research program is a set of 
methodological dispositions—dispositions to treat certain kinds of arguments 
or belief-sources as basic sources of evidence. On my view, naturalism is a 
shared research program—a subset of a maximal set of methodological 
dispositions1—that treats the methods of science and those methods alone as 
basic sources of evidence. Among its most important rivals are intuitionism 
and supernaturalism, which differ only by treating certain additional sources 
as basic (intuition in the case of intuitionism and religious experience in the 
case of supernaturalism). A source of evidence is treated as basic just in case 
it is trusted without reliance on independent evidence in favor of its 
reliability.
The claim that naturalism is a research program is controversial. But, then 
again, so is any view about the nature of naturalism: there is really no 
consensus about what exactly the position involves. Some say that naturalism 
is a metaphysical view (for example: the view that the universe is a closed 
causal system). Others say that it is an epistemological view (for example: the 
view that scientific inquiry is the only avenue to knowledge). Still others say 
that it is a view about philosophical methodology (for example: the view that 
philosophers ought to abandon traditional problems about skepticism and 
ontology and pursue their various projects in a way continuous with the 
                                                
1A set of methodological dispositions is maximal just in case it is possible to have all of 
the dispositions in the set but it is not possible to have all of them and to have other 
methodological dispositions as well. 
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involves high regard for the methods of science and low-regard for non-
scientific modes of theorizing. But a precise and even modestly non-
contentious statement of what more is involved in naturalism has yet to 
appear.
Some say that naturalism comes in different varieties, each expressible by 
a different philosophical thesis. The typical varieties listed are metaphysical, 
epistemological, and methodological naturalism. My own view, however, is 
that there is in fact only one version of naturalism, and many 
mischaracterizations of it. Given the current state of the literature, to say this 
is to say that many naturalists have mischaracterized their own naturalism. 
But I think that there are very good reasons for making this apparently 
uncharitable claim. In particular, I think that it is the only way for naturalism 
to avoid a certain kind of dissonance.
Naturalists are united at least in part by dispositions that preclude 
allegiance to views that cannot be called into question by developments in 
science. Part of what it is to be a naturalist is to respect the methods of 
science above all other forms of inquiry and to manifest a disposition to 
follow science wherever it leads. But if we take this idea seriously, then we 
are led fairly directly to the conclusion that naturalism couldn’t be a 
substantive philosophical thesis. It is clear that, if naturalism were a thesis, it 
would be a thesis of metaphysics, epistemology, or philosophical 
methodology. But the consensus among naturalists is that, in matters of 
metaphysics, epistemology, and methodology, all of our theories must 
ultimately be justified by the methods of science, any of our theories might 
be overthrown by science, and one must follow science wherever it leads. So, 
on the one hand naturalists are committed to following science wherever it
leads; on the other hand, they are committed to thinking that following 
science wherever it leads might force one to reject any thesis that might 
plausibly be identified with naturalism. To regard naturalism as a thesis, then, 
is to suppose that what is really central to naturalism is dogmatic adherence 
to some view in metaphysics, epistemology, or methodology—such that if 
the view in question were overthrown by science, naturalists would not 
retrench, rather they would be refuted. But if that supposition is correct, 
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epistemology, or methodology is in direct tension with the sort of respect for 
science and disposition to follow science wherever it leads that lies at the 
heart of the naturalist tradition.2
To avoid dissonance, then, naturalism must be characterized as something 
other than a thesis. I suppose there are many other things that it could be: an 
attitude, a value, a preference, a stance, etc. But it is not clear to me that there 
is much difference between saying that naturalism is one of these things and 
saying that it is what I say it is—namely, a research program. At any rate, 
what does seem clear—and what is most important for present purposes—is 
that naturalism is best characterized as something other than a thesis; and 
whatever label one wants to apply to it, what it seems to be most centrally is a 
plan or disposition to use the methods of science and those methods alone in 
the development of philosophical theories.
As I have said, this view of naturalism is controversial. But others have 
held it.3 Moreover, as I argued at length in World Without Design, taking
naturalism this way fits very nicely with characterizations offered by the most 
prominent spokesmen for the naturalist tradition in the 20th Century, John 
Dewey and W. V. Quine. And, furthermore, this view of naturalism faithfully 
captures what is common to virtually all who call themselves naturalists 
without immediately rendering naturalism vulnerable to the charge of 
dissonance.
3. DISSONANCE FROM ANOTHER SOURCE
In characterizing naturalism as a research program, I have rendered it 
immune to a variety of objections. It is not a thesis, so it is not refutable. 
(And so, for this reason, it cannot be self-refuting as is commonly alleged.) 
                                                
2 The argument in this paragraph is a slightly modified version of an argument I gave in 
World Without Design (pp. 51ff). The modifications were inspired by an argument 
developed independently by Bas van Fraassen for the conclusion that empiricism is 
not a philosophical thesis but a “stance”. See van Fraassen 2002, Ch. 2, esp. pp. 35 
– 46. 
3 To take just two examples, see Sellars 1922, vii, and Forrest 1996, 89.
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program are just those theses to which one is rationally committed by virtue 
of adopting the research program fully, consistently, and competently. But 
research programs do not, strictly speaking, imply anything. So one can’t 
refute naturalism by showing that it entails a falsehood. One might hope to 
show that naturalism has consequences that are rationally unacceptable, but 
the hope is in vain. For any such maneuver is destined to be dialectically 
ineffective. Again, the consequences of a research program are just those 
views to which one is rationally committed by virtue of adopting it. So it will 
be futile to try to convince a naturalist that she should regard the 
consequences of naturalism—views to which she is in fact rationally
committed—as rationally unacceptable. Nevertheless, research programs can 
still prove dissonant. And this is what we find in the case of naturalism.
Preliminary to showing this, two further features of naturalism must be 
brought to light. First, unlike empiricism, the close cousin with which 
naturalism is often mistakenly identified, naturalism is inextricably tied to 
scientific realism by virtue of treating the methods of science as basic sources 
of evidence. Precisely because they regard the methods of science as 
evidential sources, naturalists are committed to thinking that those methods 
are reliably aimed at truth and that the theories produced by those methods 
are worthy of belief. This is scientific realism—or, at any rate, it is one 
variety thereof.
Second, naturalists almost universally take themselves to be committed to 
an ontology that includes only things that can be investigated by science. This 
is most evident in the various slogans that have been offered flippantly or in 
earnest as characterizations of naturalism or of what is sometimes called 
‘metaphysical’ or ‘ontological’ naturalism. Quine, for example, characterizes 
naturalism as ‘the recognition that it is within science itself, and not in some 
prior philosophy, that reality is to be identified and described’ (1981, 66), the 
implication being that the correct ontology just is the ontology of science.
Likewise, Frederick Schmitt, in the Blackwell Companion to Metaphysics
entry on naturalism, characterizes ontological naturalism as the view that 
only natural objects are real, where ‘natural’ is understood to refer to 
whatever is recognized by science. (1995, 343) Wilfrid Sellars has famously 
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what is not that it is not.” And Armstrong’s characterization of naturalism as 
the view that reality consists of “nothing but a single, all-embracing 
spatiotemporal system” (1980, 35) seems clearly motivated by commitment 
to an ontology including nothing beyond objects that can be investigated by 
science. Of course, these are but a few examples. But as anyone familiar with 
the literature on naturalism will attest, they are perfectly representative.
These two commitments lay at the heart of the naturalist tradition. But the 
trouble is that there is direct tension between these two commitments on the 
one hand and some of the consequences of naturalism on the other. It is to a 
defense of this claim that I now turn.
In The Empirical Stance (and elsewhere), Bas van Fraassen distinguishes 
empiricists from metaphysicians as follows: Metaphysicians give absolute 
primacy to demands for explanation, and are satisfied with explanations by 
postulate; empiricists reject demands for explanation at certain points, and are 
unhappy with explanations by postulate. (2002, 36ff) In light of van 
Fraassen’s other work, I am inclined to gloss this distinction as follows: The 
metaphysicians are those for whom explanatory power is an important 
theoretical virtue, and an epistemic virtue. For metaphysicians, inference to 
the best explanation (whatever exactly that comes to) is a reliable way of 
acquiring true beliefs about the world, and if a phenomenon is best explained 
by the postulation of xs, then one ought to believe in xs. For empiricists, 
matters are otherwise: explanatory power is not terribly important, it is not an 
epistemic virtue, and the fact that postulating xs best explains some 
phenomenon is not much of a reason (if it is any reason at all) for believing in 
xs. Now, a question: Does naturalism take its stand with the metaphysicians, 
or with the empiricists?
We might appeal to authorities (like Dewey, Quine, Armstrong, and 
others) to try to settle this question. But, really, we don’t have to since 
naturalism’s commitment to scientific realism settles the question for us. If 
naturalism were to take its stand with the (van Fraassen-style) empiricists, it 
would be committed to thinking that the methods of science are not reliably 
aimed at truth. Why? Because inference to the best explanation plays an 
important role in scientific theorizing, and appeal to explanatory power plays 
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power is an epistemic virtue is precisely to affirm that scientific theories are 
sometimes (maybe often) chosen for reasons that are not correlated with 
likelihood of truth. And in that case, it makes no sense to believe a theory 
simply because it has been selected by scientific methods. So naturalists, by 
virtue of their commitment to scientific realism, must take their stand with 
the metaphysicians: Explanatory power is an epistemic virtue; inference to 
the best explanation provides reason for belief.
But now comes trouble. In World Without Design, I argued that naturalists 
are committed to, among other things, some form of substance dualism. The 
argument for this conclusion can be summed up as follows:
(i) Naturalists are committed to believing only what can be justified via 
the methods of science. But, (ii) though the methods of science provide 
justification for believing in material objects and for believing that material 
objects have modal properties, either (a) those methods provide no 
justification for believing that the modal properties of material objects are 
intrinsic, or (b) they do so only via pragmatic arguments. (iii) 
Constructivism—the thesis that modal properties are mind-dependent—
provides the best explanation for our modal knowledge if (iia) is true; and it 
also provides the best explanation for the truth-conduciveness of pragmatic 
arguments. Thus (iv) if (iia) is true, then naturalists should accept 
constructivism; and if (iib) is true, naturalists should accept constructivism. 
But (v) the modal properties of minds cannot be mind-dependent; thus, (vi) 
minds cannot be material objects. Therefore, (vii) naturalists should embrace 
some form of substance dualism.
The bulk of World Without Design is devoted to defending the premises of 
this argument; and since the defense is both lengthy and complicated, I won’t 
attempt to summarize it here. Rather, I will simply take the conclusion for 
granted, and focus my attention on the following two questions that were not 
taken up in the book: First, why does the argument spell trouble for a 
naturalist? Second, why—as the opening sentence of this paragraph 
9suggests—does the trouble come from the fact that naturalism takes its stand 
with the metaphysicians rather than the empiricists?
In regards to the first question, the argument spells trouble for a naturalist 
because, if it is sound, naturalists are committed to believing in things—
souls—that cannot be investigated by the methods of science. But, as I 
indicated earlier, naturalists are united in part by the view that the correct 
ontology includes nothing that cannot be investigated by the methods of 
science. Thus we have a point of dissonance. Moreover, the argument 
depends importantly on the role played by explanatory appeals. The claim 
that naturalists ought to embrace constructivism is explicitly grounded in the 
demand for an explanation of our modal knowledge. The claim that 
constructivism leads to dualism is implicitly grounded in the idea that mind-
body dualism provides the best explanation (given constructivism and other 
constraints imposed by naturalism) for mental phenomena. A van Fraassen-
style empiricist might simply beg off of these demands for explanation, but to 
the extent that naturalists take their stand with the metaphysicians (as 
characterized above), naturalists cannot dodge the demands. Thus we have 
our answer to the second question: It is because they take their stand with the 
metaphysicians that naturalists are forced to accept the untoward ontological 
consequences that arise out of taking certain demands for explanation 
seriously.
In sum, then, if the argument just summarized is sound, naturalism falls 
into dissonance for the following reason: By virtue of its tie to scientific 
realism, naturalism is committed to taking demands for explanation and 
inferences to the best explanation with ontological seriousness. But in doing 
this, it is forced into an ontology that includes things that cannot be 
investigated by science—an ontology that is different from the sort of 
ontology to which they take themselves to be committed. Note too that the 
latter commitment will not be an easy one to give up. It is not as if naturalists 
thought that they were committed to an ontology of atoms but learned from 
science that they were committed, say, to an ontology of fields. Rather, the 
situation is that, whereas they thought they were committed to a purely 
scientific ontology, in fact they are forced to postulate entities beyond the 
reach of science to help explain certain phenomena in the world. Of course, 
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one might respond here by saying that the very fact that souls help to explain 
phenomena in the world shows that they are not beyond the ken of science 
after all. But in the mouth of a naturalist this reply can only seem fulsome.
For, of course, dualists have always taken souls to be explanatory postulates, 
and naturalists have tended to insist that souls are inadequate explanatory 
postulates because, among other things, they are beyond the ken of science.
4. CONCLUSION
My argument in this paper has taken the form of a dilemma: Either 
naturalism is a thesis, or it is not. If it is a thesis, then it falls into dissonance 
because dogmatic adherence to a thesis is inconsistent with the naturalistic 
commitment to follow science where it leads. If it is not a thesis, it is still 
dissonant, but now for another reason. And the other reason is just this:
Naturalism is committed to scientific realism, and also to an ontology that 
includes only things that can be investigated by science. But the commitment 
to realism forces naturalists to accept arguments that proceed by way of 
inference to the best explanation; and one such argument shows that 
naturalists are committed to substance dualism, a thesis that populates our 
ontology with entities that cannot be investigated by science. Dissonance
then, if the demand for explanation is rejected, and dissonance if it is 
accepted. Thus, to the extent that a theory is successful only if it avoids 
falling into dissonance, naturalism is a failure.
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